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Note
Free Speech to a Machine? Encryption Software
Source Code Is Not Constitutionally Protected
"Speech" Under the First Amendment
Katherine A. Moerke*
In the middle of the last century, many scientists, engi-
neers, and science-fiction writers predicted that the future
would be transformed by robotics, with robots replacing human
laborers on a grand scale.' This has not yet happened; instead,
one of the largest, unanticipated technological transformations
of society is the prevalence of personal computers in people's
daily lives, both at work and at home, in a way and to a degree
few imagined.2 With computers comes a profusion of soft-
ware-the mechanism by which modern computer hardware
serves multiple functions (like word processor, video game, and
web browser). People create software to operate computers by
writing software source code in various programming lan-
guages. Currently, a debate is raging within legal, software,
and academic communities about whether source code is speech
in the First Amendment sense.
This question is important, and not merely theoretical, as
it is sure to arise in numerous contexts in which computer pro-
grammers challenge various government restrictions affecting
software on free speech grounds. The first of these challenges
concerns the federal government's export regulations of encryp-
tion software (which allow for concealed electronic communica-
tion) and presents the opportunity for courts to consider and
determine the legal status of software under the First Amend-
ment. The government regulates the export of various crypto-
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graphic technologies (including software) for national security
reasons and thereby limits computer programmers' abilities to
distribute encryption software freely, such as by posting it on
the Internet.3 People have brought suit against these regula-
tions, alleging that they abridge the freedom of speech guaran-
teed by the United States Constitution.4 Specifically, they ar-
gue that source code, the highly-structured text in which
computer programs are written, is constitutionally protected
speech.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
recently agreed that source code is protected speech in Bern-
stein v. United States Department of Justice, a panel decision
affirming the district court's broader holding.5 The court ruled
that the challenged export regulations are an impermissible
prior restraint on speech. 6 In contrast, two other federal dis-
trict courts have held that the challenged export regulations do
not violate the First Amendment. Karn v. United States De-
partment of State found the regulations valid without deter-
mining whether encryption source code is constitutionally pro-
tected speech.7 Contrary to Bernstein, Junger v. Daley found
encryption software source code insufficiently expressive to
merit full First Amendment protection.8 These cases are sig-
nificant because of their practical importance to the field of en-
cryption and to the validity of the export regulations.9 They are
3. See infra Part I.D (discussing the export regulations of encryption
software).
4. See Bernstein v. United States Dep't of Justice, 176 F.3d 1132, 1136,
reh'g granted, 192 F.3d 1308 (9th Cir. 1999); Junger v. Daley, 8 F. Supp. 2d
708, 712 (N.D. Ohio 1998); Karn v. United States Dep't of State, 925 F. Supp.
1, 9, 12 (D.D.C. 1996).
5. Bernstein, 176 F.3d at 1147. The Ninth Circuit has granted rehearing
en banc. See Bernstein v. United States Dep't of Justice, 192 F.3d 1308 (9th
Cir. 1999). Oral argument is scheduled for March 21, 2000. See Bernstein v.
United States Dep't of Justice, Order Granting Government Motion to Re-
schedule Oral Argument, available in EFF "Legal Cases-Crypto-Bernstein v.
US Dept. of State: Legalese"Archive (last modified Oct. 29, 1999) <http'//www.
eff.org/pub/Privacy/ITA.Legal/19991028_ordgran.resch.html>. Regardless of
the outcome on rehearing, the court's initial groundbreaking decision-finding
source code expression under the First Amendment-will remain influential in
other conflicts involving free speech and computer software.
6. See Bernstein, 176 F.3d at 1145.
7. Karn, 925 F. Supp. at 8-9.
8. Junger, 8 F. Supp. 2d at 717-18.
9. Several commentators have discussed these cases and evaluated the
First Amendment constitutionality of the export controls on encryption soft-
ware. See, e.g., Patrick Ian Ross, Comment, Bernstein v. United States De-
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also germane to the fundamental question of what constitutes
"speech" under the First Amendment. Other courts will look to
the reasoning and analysis of these conflicting decisions for
guidance when resolving free speech challenges to government
regulations of different types of computer software in the fu-
ture.'0
This Note discusses whether encryption software source
code is speech under the First Amendment. Part I outlines
relevant free speech principles, describes encryption software
source code, summarizes the challenged regulations, and ex-
plains the reasoning of the Bernstein, Junger, and Karn deci-
sions. Part II compares and critiques the constitutional
frameworks of these cases and evaluates the technical nature of
source code. This Note concludes that encryption software
source code itself is not speech under the First Amendment, al-
though it may be entitled to some First Amendment protection
nonetheless because it protects the ability to speak privately.
I. FREE SPEECH PRINCIPLES AND GOVERNMENT
REGULATION OF ENCRYPTION SOFTWARE
The First Amendment creates the right to free speech and
protects against state censorship of expression. Whether gov-
partment of State, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 405, 415-16 (1998) (discussing the
first district court opinion in Bernstein and concluding that the court's result
was correct, but its reasoning suspect because "[niot all source code is speech
protected by the First Amendment"); James J. Carter, Comment, The Devil
and Daniel Bernstein: Constitutional Flaws and Practical Fallacies in the En-
ctyption Export Controls, 76 OR. L. REV. 981, 982 (1997) (discussing the Bern-
stein, Karn, and Junger district court opinions and focusing on the effective-
ness of the encryption export controls); John P. Collins, Jr., Case Note,
Speaking in Code, 106 YALE L.J. 2691, 2692 (1997) (arguing that crypto-
graphic computer source code is "pure conduct not entitled to any First
Amendment protection"); David T. Movius, Note & Comment, Bernstein v.
United States Department of State: Encryption, Justiciability, and the First
Amendment, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 1051, 1069-70 (1997) (approving the district
court opinions in Bernstein and focusing on changes in the relevant export
regulations); Yvonne C. Ocrant, Comment, A Constitutional Challenge to En-
cryption Export Regulations: Software Is Speechless, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 503,
505 (1998) (discussing the Bernstein and Karn district court opinions and ar-
guing that 1) "encryption software is not speech," 2) "even if software is
speech, software is not speech protected by the First Amendment," and 3)
"even if software is speech protected under the First Amendment, software is
expressive conduct and thus is afforded limited First Amendment protection").
10. Circuit Judge Bright, sitting by designation, suggested that the im-
portance of this issue makes Bernstein appropriate for review by the United




ernment regulations abridge the freedom of speech depends on
the type of speech and the type of regulations involved. The
federal government's export regulations of encryption software,
which allow for the encoding and decoding of electronic mes-
sages or information, give rise to the question of whether en-
cryption software source code is protected speech under the
First Amendment. Three federal courts have answered this
question, each reaching a different conclusion.
A. PROTECTED "SPEECH" UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT
The free speech right is expressly granted in the United
States Constitution. The First Amendment provides that
"Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press."' From this language, it seems obvious
that the initial question asked in a free speech challenge neces-
sarily must be whether "speech" (or "the press") is involved at
all. Supreme Court precedent has, however, provided surpris-
ingly little guidance on this issue.12 Most First Amendment
cases do not begin by determining whether a certain activity is
speech;' 3 and this issue usually is not discussed when the ac-
tivity in question is plainly speech protected by the First
Amendment, such as a political debate or dramatic perform-
ance. 14
The Supreme Court has provided guidance about what
constitutes speech under the First Amendment most often
when the activity in question has involved non-verbal expres-
sion. 15 As the Court has clearly stated, the protection of the
First Amendment "does not end at the spoken or written
11. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
12. See generally R. Polk Wagner, The Medium Is the Mistake: The Law of
Software for the First Amendment, 51 STAN. L. REV. 387 (1999) (discussing
and contrasting what the author terms the Supreme Court's ontological mode,
which focuses on the alleged "speech," with the teleological mode, which fo-
cuses on the motive of the regulations, and concluding that the teleological ap-
proach is preferable for extending robust First Amendment protection to new
media).
13. See id. at 392 ("That the threshold question is not always explicitly
answered by the Court does not mean that it does not exist.").
14. See id. at 392-93.
15. See, e.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 566-67 (1991)
(concluding that prohibitions on nude dancing do not violate the First
Amendment); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 415 (1974) (per curiam)
(concluding that flag defacing could be protected under the First Amendment);
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382-83 (1968) (concluding that draft
card burning is not protected under the First Amendment).
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word."16 Therefore, when a person chooses not to articulate his
views in words, the Court determines whether his conduct is
"sufficiently imbued with elements of communication" to impli-
cate the First Amendment.' 7 This expressive conduct analysis
is most applicable when "symbolic speech" is involved. 8
The Supreme Court has also emphasized the values em-
braced by the First Amendment in determining whether a cer-
tain activity or class of activities constitutes speech, because
"not all speech is of equal First Amendment importance." 9 The
Court has emphasized repeatedly that the judiciary must be
sensitive to any infringement of "genuinely serious literary, ar-
tistic, political, or scientific expression."20 Free speech values
include the "marketplace of ideas" and search for truth,21 un-
impaired political discussion,2 2 and individualism and auton-
omy. Although speech on a particular occasion need not pro-
mote these values to be protected, consideration of values
influences the Court's determinations of what types of expres-
sion are entitled to First Amendment protection.23 For exam-
ple, although an activity, such as advertising product prices, is
16. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989) (holding that flag burning
is protected speech).
17. Spence, 418 U.S. at 409, 415 (holding that a flag improper-use statute,
as applied to appellant's activity of displaying a flag with a peace symbol af-
fixed, impermissibly infringed protected activity); see also O'Brien, 391 U.S. at
377 (holding that governmental regulation preventing draft-card burning did
not violate the First Amendment because it was a narrow means of protecting
a substantial interest).
18. See, e.g., Barnes, 501 U.S. at 566-67 (applying the four-part O'Brien
test).
19. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758
(1985) (finding that matters of public concern are of more value than those
that are only of private concern).
20. E.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973) (incorporating this
phrasing into its test of what constitutes obscenity). The Court stated in dicta
that "[tihe First Amendment protects works which, taken as a whole, have se-
rious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." Id. at 34.
21. See, e.g., Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969). "It is
the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace
of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail .... " Id. (citations omitted).
22. See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (stating that
free speech assures "unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of
political and social changes desired by the people" and upholding a prohibition
on mailing obscene materials).
23. See id. (emphasizing that obscenity, "as utterly without redeeming so-
cial importance," is not protected); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.
568, 572 (1942) (emphasizing that fighting words are so far removed from any
"exposition of ideas" that they are not entitled to free speech protection).
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related to the commercial marketplace, it may also have value
as speech in the "marketplace of ideas."24 Conversely, types of
speech categorically excluded from free speech protection are
excluded (at least in part) because they are considered of slight
social value25 or even directly harmful.26 In some sense, these
types of speech are not provided First Amendment protection
because they are not speech at all.27 The proper understand-
ing, though, is that these types of expression are unprotected
speech.28
Because of the scarcity of precedent concerning what con-
stitutes speech under the First Amendment, the Supreme
Court's specific holdings also have increased relevance to the
issue. Either by neglecting or by applying analysis about what
constitutes speech, the Supreme Court has concluded that the
freedom of speech may encompass, for example, flag burning,29
24. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Coun-
cil, 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976) (emphasizing that commercial speech-publishing
commercial drug prices-is not wholly unrelated to traditional free speech
values and holding that it is protected by the First Amendment).
25. See, e.g., Roth, 354 U.S. at 484 (finding obscenity unprotected for this
reason).
26. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382 (1968) (contrasting the
draft-card-burning statute with a situation where the governmental regula-
tory interest arises because the communication in question "is itself thought to
be harmful").
27. This reasoning does not always apply, however. For example, fighting
words are an unprotected category of speech, see infra note 38 and accompa-
nying text, but shouting "I am going to kill you" is obviously speech in the or-
dinary sense of the word.
28. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383 (1992) (noting that the
freedom of speech does not extend to a few limited categories of speech). The
Court noted that it has:
sometimes said that these categories of expression are "not within the
area of constitutionally protected speech".. . or that the "protection of
the First Amendment does not extend" to them.... Such statements
must be taken in context, however, and are no more literally true
than is the occasionally repeated shorthand characterizing obscenity
"as not being speech at all."... What they mean is that these areas of
speech can, consistently with the First Amendment, be regulated be-
cause of their constitutionally proscribable content (obscenity, defama-
tion, etc.).
Id. (quoting Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 124 (1989);
Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 504
(1984); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 483 (1957); Cass R. Sunstein,
Pornography and the First Amendment, 1986 Duke L.J. 589, 615 n.146)).
29. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 418 (1989) (holding that a convic-
tion for burning the United States flag as a political protest violates the First
Amendment because "the expressive, overtly political nature of the conduct
was both intentional and overwhelmingly apparent"); see also Spence v.
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a parade,30 the wearing of black armbands as a protest,31 and
nude dancing---"expressive conduct within the outer perimeters
of the First Amendment. '32 Speech is protected if it is sold for
profit, such as in books or movies, or proposes a commercial
transaction.33 The First Amendment protects traditional forms
of expression, such as peacefully distributing leaflets, 34 but also
affords robust protection to the Internet, as a new mode of
communication. 35 Some lower courts have concluded that
choice of language is expression under the First Amendment.3 6
Conversely, the Supreme Court has excluded categorically
several types of speech from protection under the First
Amendment. 37 Fighting words, for example, are not protected
Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 415 (1974) (per curiam).
30. See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group, 515
U.S. 557, 568-70 (1995) (holding that a parade was protected expression be-
cause marchers are making a collective point, not just moving from here to
there).
31. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503,
505-06 (1969) (holding that the wearing of armbands conveyed an unmistak-
able message and was protected speech).
32. In Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 566 (1991) (plurality
opinion), Chief Justice Rehnquist accepted the premise that nude dancing is
sufficiently expressive to receive some First Amendment protection. See id.
The state's ordinance prohibiting public nudity was content-neutral, however,
and constitutional under the O'Brien test. See id. at 567.
33. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, 425 U.S. 748, 761, 770 (1976) (holding that commercial speech is pro-
tected but that some regulation is permissible) (citations omitted).
34. See Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419
(1971) (holding that peaceful distribution of informational literature was un-
constitutionally prohibited by injunction) (citations omitted).
35. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 859-64 (1997) (holding that the "in-
decent transmission" and "patently offensive display" provisions of the Com-
munications Decency Act of 1996 abridge the freedom of speech protected by
the First Amendment).
36. See, e.g., Asian Am. Bus. Group v. City of Pomona, 716 F. Supp. 1328,
1330 (C.D. Cal. 1989) (holding that "[cihoice of language is a form of expres-
sion as real as the textual message conveyed"); see also Yniguez v. Arizonans
for Official English, 69 F.3d 920, 934-36 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (discussing
the fact that speech in any language is protected by the First Amendment),
cert. granted, 517 U.S. 1102 (1996), vacated sub nom. Arizonans for Official
English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43 (1997). The Ninth Circuit, in assessing the
constitutionality of an English-only amendment to Arizona's constitution, con-
cluded that "[1]anguage is by definition speech, and the regulation of any lan-
guage is the regulation of speech." Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 934-35.
37. The classic illustration of this maxim is that one may not cry "fire"
falsely in a crowded theatre. See, e.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47,
52 (1919) ("The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a
man in falsely shouting 'fire' in a theatre and causing a panic."). Of course,
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because the speech itself inflicts injury or tends to incite imme-
diate violence.38 Likewise, obscenity39 and defamation 4° are not
protected by the First Amendment.
The First Amendment does not apply only to protected
speech itself. It protects the communication, the speaker, and
the listener(s).41 Therefore, the freedom of speech may not be
abridged merely because the speaker could speak elsewhere or
because the speaker's listeners could receive the message by
other means.42 The First Amendment may also protect the
right not to speak publicly.43
one can cry "fire" falsely in a crowded theatre. The point is that the govern-
ment constitutionally may punish one for doing so.
38. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (uphold-
ing a criminal conviction under a statute prohibiting language tending to in-
cite a breach of the peace because appellant's speech constituted non-protected
conduct).
39. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957). Miller v. Califor-
nia set out the current standard of what constitutes obscenity:
The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether "the
average person, applying contemporary community standards" would
find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest;
(b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way,
sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c)
whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value.
413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (citations omitted); cf Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184,
197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (stating that obscenity is difficult to de-
fine, but "I know it when I see it").
40. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280-83 (1964). Al-
though defamation is an unprotected category of speech, the Court held that a
public official may recover damages only when a statement was made with
"actual malice." Id. at 280.
41. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, 425 U.S. 748, 756-57 (1976) (citations omitted).
42. See id. at 756 n.14; Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939)
("[Olne is not to have the exercise of his liberty of expression in appropriate
places abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place.").
43. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539,
559 (1985) (quoting Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 23 N.Y.2d
341, 348 (1986)). The Court stated:
The essential thrust of the First Amendment is to prohibit improper
restraints on the voluntary public expression of ideas; it shields the
man who wants to speak or publish when others wish him to be quiet.
There is necessarily, and within suitably defined areas, a concomitant
freedom not to speak publicly, one which serves the same ultimate
end as freedom of speech in its affirmative aspect.
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B. "ABRIDGING" THE FREEDOM OF SPEECH
Despite the absolute wording of the First Amendment, the
free speech right is not absolute, and the government may
regulate speech in certain circumstances.44 Not all speech is
protected, and not all protected speech is protected equally.45
Therefore, whether regulations abridge the freedom of speech
depends on the type of speech and the type of regulation.46
First, the constitutionality of state regulation of speech de-
pends on the type of speech involved. Categories of unprotected
speech may be regulated, prevented, and punished.47 Regula-
tions affecting less-protected categories of speech are subject to
less stringent judicial review than those affecting fully-
protected speech.48 Although the Supreme Court has recog-
nized some differences in justifiable government regulations of
speech depending on the medium involved, 49 First Amendment
scrutiny of speech through the Internet is not similarly quali-
fied.50
Second, government regulations may violate the First
Amendment by restricting speech based on its content 5' or by
acting as a prior restraint on speech. The freedom of speech
generally prevents the government from censoring speech be-
44. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
45. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 483 (1957) ("IThe First
Amendment was not intended to protect every utterance.").
46. The First Amendment restricts government action. In other words,
the "freedom of speech" applies to the censorship of speech by the government.
Thus, it does not violate the First Amendment, when, for example, a newspa-
per chooses not to publish a letter to the editor.
47. See Roth, 354 U.S. at 485.
48. Regulations of fully-protected speech are subject to strict judicial scru-
tiny. Regulations affecting less-protected speech are subject to intermediate
scrutiny. Under intermediate scrutiny: "First, the government must assert a
substantial interest in support of its regulation; second, the government must
demonstrate that the restriction on commercial speech directly and materially
advances that interest; and third, the regulation must be 'narrowly drawn."'
Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 624 (1995) (quoting Central
Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564-65
(1980)).
49. In Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, the Supreme Court
stated that "[elach medium of expression... may present its own problems."
420 U.S. 546, 557 (1975). Some cases have recognized special justifications for
regulation of the broadcast media. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S.
726, 760-61 (1978); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 396 (1969).
50. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
51. Unprotected categories of speech are the exception to this rule, of
course, since they are excluded from protection based precisely on content.
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cause of disapproval of the views expressed or disagreement
with its message.52 Accordingly, content-based regulations are
presumptively impermissible and subject to strict scrutiny.53
Content-neutral regulations, on the other hand, are subject
only to intermediate scrutiny.54 When content-neutral govern-
ment regulations restrict expressive conduct, in which both
speech and non-speech elements are present, a sufficiently im-
portant government interest for regulating the non-speech as-
pect(s) justifies incidental limitations on free speech.55 United
States v. O'Brien laid out the following four-part test to deter-
mine whether government regulations are permissible under
these circumstances:
[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the
constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or
substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is un-
related to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental re-
striction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is
52. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 381-82 (1992); Texas
v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (stating that a "bedrock principle" of the
First Amendment "is that the government may not prohibit the expression of
an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable").
53. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994);
Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988) (plurality opinion). "Our cases indi-
cate that.., a content-based restriction on political speech in a public fo-
rum.., must be subjected to the most exacting scrutiny." Boos, 485 U.S. at
321 (citing Board of Airport Comm'rs v. Jews for Jesus, 482 U.S. 569, 572-573
(1987); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788,
800 (1985); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45
(1983); United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983)). Strict scrutiny re-
quires narrowly tailored regulations necessary to serve a compelling state in-
terest. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 512 U.S. at 642; Boos, 485 U.S. at
321. Essentially, a content-based regulation requires reading, listening to, or
otherwise observing the speech in order to regulate it. In contrast, an example
of content-neutral regulation would be the restriction of noise above a certain
decibel after a certain time of night.
54. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 512 U.S. at 662 (citing United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)). Intermediate scrutiny requires
an important or substantial government interest and narrowly tailored regu-
lations that are "unrelated to the suppression of free expression." Id. Regula-
tions on less-protected speech are also subject to intermediate scrutiny. See
supra note 48 and accompanying text.
55. See Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 289
(1984) (holding that "a National Park Service regulation prohibiting camping
in certain parks [does not violate] the First Amendment when applied to pro-
hibit demonstrators from sleeping in Lafayette Park and the Mall in connec-
tion with a demonstration intended to call attention to the plight of the home-
less"). The Court assumed that the plaintiffs' demonstration was expressive
conduct and applied intermediate scrutiny. See id. at 293.
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essential to the furtherance of that interest.5 6
This balancing test is most often applied to symbolic speech.57
Another primary purpose of the First Amendment is to
prevent prior restraints on speech 58 because such restraints
pose the dangers of government censorship as well as "self-
censorship."59 Therefore, regulations that act as prior re-
straints on speech and publication, like content-based regula-
tions, also have a "heavy presumption" against constitutional
validity and are subject to the strictest judicial scrutiny.60
Prior restraints may arise by judicial injunctions preventing
publication or through licensing schemes that allow unre-
strained government discretion to restrict speech.61
Plaintiffs may bring facial challenges 62 to regulations that
allegedly constitute prior restraints when the regulations "have
a close enough nexus to expression, or to conduct commonly as-
sociated with expression, to pose a real and substantial threat"
of censorship.63 To be constitutional, prior restraints must pro-
56. 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
57. See, e.g., Clark, 468 U.S. at 289 (involving demonstration about the
plight of the homeless by sleeping outside in tents).
58. See Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 713 (1931).
59. City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 757 (1988).
60. E.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971)
(per curiam); Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 418-19
(1971) (citations omitted); see also Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad,
420 U.S. 546, 558 (1975) (noting that prior restraints are not "unconstitutional
per se").
61. See, e.g., City of Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 757 (holding that an ordinance
giving the government unfettered discretion regarding the placement of news-
paper racks was unconstitutional); New York Times Co., 403 U.S. at 714 (re-
viewing the government's request for an injunction).
62. A facial challenge contests legislation on its face, rather than as ap-
plied. In the context of this Note, this means that plaintiffs may challenge the
export regulations without first applying for a license or submitting the en-
cryption technology for a technical review. See infra Part I.D (discussing the
regulations at issue). Although facial challenges are generally disfavored,
they are permitted in the First Amendment context when a licensing scheme
allows the government "unbridled discretion" and when regulations are chal-
lenged as overbroad. See FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 223
(1990) (determining whether the claim was within the "narrow class of per-
missible facial challenges to allegedly unconstrained grants of regulatory
authority").
63. City of Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 757. The Court emphasized that the
regulation at issue was 1) "directed narrowly and specifically at expression or
conduct commonly associated with expression: the circulation of newspapers;"
and 2) not a law of general application carrying "little danger of censorship."
Id. at 760-61; see also Roulette v. City of Seattle, 97 F.3d 300, 303 (9th. Cir.
1996) (holding that prohibition on sitting on sidewalks was not subject to fa-
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vide adequate procedural safeguards.64 If a licensing scheme
does not present the "grave 'dangers" of censorship, however,
full procedural protections are not required. 65
C. ENCRYPTION SOFTWARE SOURCE CODE
The issue of whether encryption software source code is
protected speech under the First Amendment arises because of
the federal government's export regulations of encryption soft-
ware (discussed below in Part I.D). Encryption software allows
for electronic communication and information to be kept confi-
dential. Encryption 66 translates a readable message into an
indecipherable one to keep the message secret. 67 Cryptography
was traditionally a military science,6 8 but today is also of great
interest to individuals and businesses as a way to keep com-
munication confidential and protect privacy, especially with re-
gard to the Internet and other digital media. 69
Computers have improved greatly the task of encryption-
encoding and decoding messages.70 Encryption software en-
cial challenge, even though sometimes sitting may be expressive).
64. See Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58-59 (1965). These safe-
guards include: 1) that the burden of proving "unprotected expression must
rest on the censor"; 2) a "specified brief period" to issue or deny a license; and
3) a "prompt final judicial decision." Id.
65. FW/PBS, Inc., 493 U.S. at 228 (quoting Freedman, 380 U.S. at 58).
The essential safeguards that remain are that the license must be issued
within a reasonable period of time and that prompt judicial review must be
possible. See id.
66. Encryption is an application of the science of cryptography and has
been around for thousands of years. See Edward J. Radlo, Legal Issues in
Cryptography, COMPUTER LAW., May 1996, at 1, 1-2.
67. An illustrative example of encryption is provided in NATIONAL
RESEARCH COUNCIL, CRYPTOGRAPHY'S ROLE IN SECURING THE INFORMATION
SOCIETY 374 (1996). A simple encryption system could shift each letter of a
message one position. The phrase "freedom of speech" would thus become
"gsffepn pg tqffdi."
68. See Radlo, supra note 66, at 2. Governments use encryption to protect
their communication from other nations and to attempt to decipher the pro-
tected communications of other nations.
69. See id. Related applications include ensuring data integrity (pre-
venting tampering or altering a message), authenticating users (stamping
messages with digital signatures), facilitating nonrepudiation (linking of a
specific message with a specific sender), and maintaining confidentiality
(making a message readable only to the intended recipient). See NATIONAL
RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 67, at 374.
70. See Radlo, supra note 66, at 2 (noting that mechanical encryption sys-
tems were developed around the turn of the century and that computerized
systems were developed beginning in the 1950s).
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crypts readable "plaintext" into unintelligible "ciphertext" by
using a mathematical algorithm.71 Encryption software also
decrypts ciphertext back into plaintext for the recipient with
the appropriate compatible "key."72  In other words, the key
"unlocks" the encoded message.
Computer programmers develop encryption software, as
they do all software, by writing source code.73 Source code is
the text of computer software written in a high-level program-
ming language.74 Source code contains precise operating in-
structions and may also contain comments about the code.
75
Programmers write source code in any of numerous program-
ming languages, such as Java or C++.76 Programming lan-
guages are highly structured and allow software developers to
produce executable computer programs.77 A compiler trans-
lates source code into object code, comprised of binary digits (Is
and 0s), which the computer can directly read to execute a
function.78 Hence, once source code is compiled into object code,
the computer may run the software program.7
9
71. See id. at 1; see also Bernstein v. United States Dep't of Justice, 176
F.3d 1132, 1136-37, reh'g granted, 192 F.3d 1308 (9th Cir. 1999). An algo-
rithm is a prescribed set of operations that performs a specific task.
72. See Radlo, supra note 66, at 1. An encryption key is analogous to a
mechanical key that unlocks a mechanical door. See id. A key in encryption
software is a word containing a certain number of bits; the number is the
"keylength" or "keyspace." See id; see also Bernstein, 176 F.3d at 1136-37.
73. Originally, computers did not work by running software. Instead they
were manually programmed to perform specific tasks. Today, software pro-
grams enable a computer to perform numerous functions and offer various ca-
pabilities. See Ocrant, supra note 9, at 505-06 (providing a short account of
softvare development and explaining that software makes computers "'uni-
versal machines").
74. See Charles H. Davidson, Object Program, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
COMPUTER SCIENCE 962 (Anthony Ralston & Edwin D. Reilly eds., 3d ed.
1993).
75. See Ocrant, supra note 9, at 507. Programmers customarily include
explanatory notes about the code to document the programming methods and
facilitate future modifications.
76. See Davidson, supra note 74, at 962.
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. Whether encryption software source code is speech-the issue of this
Note--cannot be determined without understanding the relationship and dis-
tinctions among a mathematical algorithm, source code, and object code. This
is illustrated well by the following concrete example for the Sieve of Eratos-
thenes, an algorithm for finding prime numbers. See CARL B. BOYER, A
HISTORY OF MATHEMATICS 160-61 (Uta C. Merzbach revis., 2d ed. 1991).
(This example is particularly fitting because prime numbers are significant to
encryption software. For some types of public key encryption, the difficult
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part of "cracking" the code can involve trying to find the prime factors of an
extremely large number. Bernstein himself has posted source code for gener-
ating prime numbers on the web, using the Sieve of Atkin instead of the tradi-
tional Sieve of Eratosthenes. See D.J. Bernstein, Number Theory (visited Feb.
1, 2000) <ftp://koobera.math.uic.eduwww/primegen.html>. His code, unlike
the code provided here, is longer and more complex because it was written, not
for illustration, but to work quickly.)
MATHEMATICAL ALGORITHM
The simplest description of the algorithm is one in plain English:
Make a list of all the integers less than or equal to n (and greater
than one). Strike out the multiples of all primes less than or
equal to the square root of n. The numbers left are the prime
numbers.
Nicholas A. Coult, Sieve of Eratosthenes Description (1999) (provided for this
Note) (on file with author); see also BOYER, supra, at 160-61.
A more formal description of the algorithm can be given in terms
of mathematical steps:
Input an upper bound n.
Mark all the numbers between 2 and n with a 1.
For every number p less than or equal to the square root of n,
perform the following step:
For every number j which is a multiple of p and is less than or
equal to n, markj with a 0.
Output the list of numbers between 2 and n and their associated
Os and is.
Those numbers marked with a 1 are prime numbers.
Nicholas A. Coult, Sieve of Eratosthenes Algorithm (1999) (provided for this
Note) (on file with author).
SOURCE CODE
Following is source code for the algorithm, written in C in com-











do p++; while (alp]!=l);
I
Nicholas A. Coult, Sieve of Eratosthenes Source Code (1999) (provided for this
Note) (on file with author).
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D. EXPORT REGULATIONS OF ENCRYPTION SOFTWARE
The federal government's export controls on encryption
software make adjudicable the question of whether source code
is protected speech under the First Amendment. Although the
validity of the export regulations is not the primary focus of
this Note, it is nonetheless important to understand the context
in which this theoretical free speech question has arisen.
The government regulates encryption software and other
technologies because of foreign policy and national security in-
terests. 80 Specifically, the regulations are based on the gov-
ernment's interest in intercepting and deciphering foreign
communications. 8 1 The regulations of encryption software now
at issue are the Export Administration Regulations (EAR)
promulgated by the Department of Commerce. 82 The EAR
regulate the export of "machine-readable" encryption source
code or object code, although printed materials containing the
same code are not subject to the regulations.8 3 Posting soft-
OBJECT CODE
When compiled on a Sun SPARCstation 5 using egcs-1.1.2, the object code
consists of 3,348 bytes-a string of 26,784 zeros and ones. See Interview with
Nicholas A. Coult, Research Associate, Institute for Mathematics and Its Ap-
plications, University of Minnesota (Nov. 1999 & Feb. 2000). Object code
length and content varies depending upon the compiler and the computer. See
id.
80. See, e.g., 22 U.S.C.A. § 2778(a)(1) (West 1990 & Supp. 1999) (granting
presidential authority to control import and export of defense articles "[fln fur-
therance of world peace and the security and foreign policy of the United
States").
81. See Ocrant, supra note 9, at 513-14 (citing The Government's Classifi-
cation of Private Ideas: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on
Government Operations, 96th Cong. 423-26 (1980)). In addition, the govern-
ment seeks to prevent concealed communication among criminals. See id. at
515.
82. See 15 C.F.R. §§ 730-774 (1998). The EAR define terms pertinent to
the free speech question as follows: Encryption software--"[c]omputer pro-
grams that provide capability of encryption fimctions or confidentiality of in-
formation or information systems. Such software includes source code, object
code, applications software, or system softvare," id. § 772, encryption source
code--"precise set of operating instructions to a computer that, when com-
piled, allows for the execution of an encryption function on a computer," id.,
encryption object code--"[c]omputer programs containing an encryption source
code that has been compiled into a form of code that can be directly executed
by a computer to perform an encryption fimction," id.
83. See id. § 734.3(b) & note to (b)(2) & (b)(3). Encryption software is
regulated differently than other software. See id. § 772. According to the pro-
vision, "[e]ncryption software is controlled because ... it has a functional ca-
pacity to encrypt information on a computer system, and not because of any
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ware on the Internet is considered an export. 84 To export en-
cryption software or technology, one must obtain a license from
the government8 5 or be subject to severe penalties.8 6
The Clinton Administration has made and continues to
make frequent changes to the export regulations governing en-
cryption software. 87 The Administration's modifications of the
informational or theoretical value that such software may reflect, contain or
represent, or that its export may convey to others abroad." Id.
84. See id. § 734.2(b)(9)(B)(ii). Nonmilitary encryption items are included
in the Commerce Control List (CCL). See id. § 774. Under the regulations,
exporting includes:
downloading, or causing the downloading of, such software to loca-
tions (including electronic bulletin boards, Internet file transfer pro-
tocol, and World Wide Web sites) outside the U.S. (except Canada), or
making such software available for transfer outside the United States
(except Canada), over wire, cable, radio, electromagnetic, photo opti-
cal, photoelectric or other comparable communications facilities ac-
cessible to persons outside the United States (except Canada), in-
cluding transfers from electronic bulletin boards, Internet file
transfer protocol and World Wide Web sites, unless the person mak-
ing the software available takes precautions adequate to prevent un-
authorized transfer of such code outside the United States or Canada.
Id. § 734.2(b)(9)(B)(ii).
85. See id. § 742.15(a). To grant a license, the government determines
whether the export is "consistent with U.S. national security and foreign pol-
icy interests" on a case-by-case basis. Id. § 742.15(b). License applications
must be resolved or referred to the President within 90 days. See id.§ 750.4(a). Internal administrative appeals must be completed within a rea-
sonable time. See id. § 756.2(c)(1). Final administrative decisions are not
subject to judicial review. See id. § 756.2(c)(2); see also 22 U.S.C.A. § 2778(h)
(West 1990 & Supp. 1999). A one-time technical review is now replacing the
licensing requirement. See infra notes 87-96 and accompanying text.
86. The penalties for improperly exporting an item include fines up to five
times the value of the exports or $50,000 (whichever is greater), imprisonment
for up to five years, or both. See 15 C.F.R. § 764.3(b)(1) (1998). Civil penalties
also include fines up to $10,000 and the denial of export privileges. See id.
§ 764.3(a)(1) & (2). Under International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR),
the penalties for improperly exporting an item include fines up to $1 million,
imprisonment for up to 10 years, or both. See 22 U.S.C.A. § 2778(c).
87. In 1996, President Clinton shifted licensing responsibility for nonmili-
tary encryption items from the State Department to the Department of Com-
merce. See Exec. Order No. 13026, 3 C.F.R. § 228 (1996). Previously, the
regulations at issue were the ITAR promulgated by the State Department to
implement the Arms Export Control Act. See 22 C.F.R. §§ 120-130 (1998). The
ITAR include the United States Munitions List (USML), which designates "de-
fense articles" subject to the regulations. Id. § 121.1. Congress enacted the
Arms Export Control Act (AECA) to regulate the import and export of prod-
ucts with military uses. See 22 U.S.C.A. § 2778. The Arms Export Control Act
(AECA) authorizes the President to "control the import and export of defense
articles and defense services and to provide foreign policy guidance to persons
of the United States involved in the export and import of such articles and
services." Id. § 2778(a)(1).
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regulations seem intended to address industry concerns about
international business competition, not to avoid the free speech
issue.88 In September 1999, President Clinton again an-
nounced several changes in the Administration's export pol-
icy.89 Exports will continue to be prohibited to seven nations
considered terrorist.9 0 Otherwise, the licensing requirement for
encryption commodities and software will be replaced with a
one-time technical review.91 Licenses would still be required
for exports of encryption technology and software source code.92
In October 1999, however, the Clinton Administration an-
nounced the possibility of relaxed export regulations on com-
puter source code as well.93 These revised encryption regula-
tions were released in January 2000.94 Now, encryption source
code also may be distributed to foreign nations (except for those
seven considered terrorist) following the one-time technical re-
view, rather than the licensing requirement.95 Although the
88. The Administration is, however, not ignorant of the issue. The Execu-
tive Order transferring the authority of the regulations to the Commerce De-
partment stated that "the export of encryption software, like the export of
other encryption products described in this section, must be controlled because
of such software's functional capacity, rather than because of any possible in-
formational value of such software." Exec. Order No. 13026, 3 C.F.R. § 228
(1996).
89. See Jeri Clausing, In a Reversal, White House Will End Data-
Encryption Export Curbs, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 1999, at C1.
90. See id. These countries are Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria, Sudan, North Ko-
rea, and Cuba. See id.
91. See U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Update to Encryption Policy: Questions
and Answers (last modified Sept. 16, 1999) <www.bxa.doc.gov/Encryption/
q&a99.htm>.
92. See id. ("Source code will continue to be reviewed under a case-by-case
basis .... ").
93. See Ann Harrison, U.S. May Soften Source-Code Export Policy,
COMPUTERWORLD, Oct. 25, 1999, at 12. Because Bernstein's prior restraint
analysis would apply to the remaining restrictions on source code (i.e., the
technical review as well as the prohibition to the countries designated as ter-
rorist), the preliminary question of whether source code is protected under the
First Amendment remains.
94. Originally, the Administration announced that changes would be re-
leased December 15, 1999. See id. The administration decided to delay the
release, however, to permit further consultations with affected parties to help
determine how to best match the regulations with industry practices. See U.S.
Dep't of Commerce, Statement of Commerce Under Secretary William A Re-
insch On Delay of Encryption Regulation (last modified Dec. 13, 1999)
<www.bxa.doc.gov/PRESS/99/EncryptRegDelay.html>.
95. See David E. Sanger & Jeri Clausing, U.S. Removes More Limits on
Encryption, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2000, at C1. The new regulations were pub-
lished in the Federal Register on Friday, January 14, 2000. See generally Re-
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export regulations have changed, restrictions on the distribu-
tion of encryption software source code remain and continue to
present the question of source code's status under the First
Amendment.96
E. CIRCUIT SPLIT: KARN, JUNGER, AND BERNSTEIN
In three federal cases, plaintiffs have challenged the gov-
ernment's export regulations of encryption software on First
Amendment grounds.97 Each case approached the free speech
issue differently, and their holdings conflict. In Karn v. United
States Department of State, the District of Columbia District
Court did not determine whether encryption software source
code is speech, but rather assumed that the First Amendment
applies.98 The court found the government regulation content-
neutral and thus subject to the test set forth in O'Brien.99 Un-
der this test, the court found the regulation of the plaintiffs
software constitutional because it was narrowly tailored to the
government's significant interest in national security.100
visions to Encryption Items, 65 Fed. Reg. 2492 (2000) (to be codified at 15
C.F.R. pts. 734, 740, 742, 770, 772, & 774) (interim final rule and request for
comments).
96. Alan Davidson, a lawyer with the Center for Democracy and Technol-
ogy, an online civil liberties group, has complained that the new regulations
are still very complicated and "'do not clearly fix the fundamental Constitu-
tional flaw in the U.S. policy that says researchers have to ask for permission
before they exchange ideas with people outside of the United States.'" Sanger
& Clausing, supra note 95, at C23. As noted, the First Amendment is still im-
plicated even if the speaker can express himself somewhere else. See supra
note 42 and accompanying text.
97. See Bernstein v. United States Dep't of Justice, 176 F.3d 1132, 1138,
reh'g granted, 192 F.3d 1308 (9th Cir. 1999); Junger v. Daley, 8 F. Supp. 2d
708, 711 (N.D. Ohio 1998); Karn v. United States Dep't of State, 925 F. Supp.
1, 3-4 (D.D.C. 1996). At the time of the Karn case, the ITAR promulgated by
the State Department were in force. By the time of the Junger case, the Ex-
port Administration Regulations (EAR) promulgated by the Department of
Commerce were in effect.
98. See Karn, 925 F. Supp. at 9. Although the court assumed free speech
protection, it noted that "[slource codes are merely a means of commanding a
computer to perform a function." Id. at 9 n.19.
99. See id. at 10-11; see also supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text
(laying out the O'Brien test). The court rejected the plaintiffs argument for
strict scrutiny of "pure speech" by its understanding that the government's ra-
tionale for the regulation determines the level of scrutiny to be applied. See
Karn, 925 F. Supp. at 10-11.
100. See Karn, 925 F. Supp. at 12. Because the "plaintiff attempts to dis-
guise a disagreement with the foreign policy judgment of the President as a
factual dispute," the court rejected the plaintiffs argument that the ITAR
were not narrowly tailored because encryption source code is already widely
1024
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Unlike Karn, the court in Junger v. Daley squarely ad-
dressed whether encryption source code is speech. 1 1 The court
rejected the argument that source code necessarily equals
speech because it is written in a language, stating that the ap-
propriate inquiry is "whether it expresses ideas."10 2 Although
encryption software source code can "occasionally have commu-
nicative elements," 10 3 the court concluded that it is not suffi-
ciently expressive to merit full First Amendment protection. 1°4
Consequently, it found a facial challenge inappropriate.'0 5 The
court found the regulations content-neutral and therefore sub-
ject to intermediate scrutiny, which it held the regulations eas-
ily satisfied. 106
In Bernstein v. United States Department of Justice, the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals determined whether the export
regulations of encryption software are a prior restraint on
speech that violates the First Amendment. 10 7 Bernstein devel-
oped and sought to distribute encryption source code by posting
available in foreign countries. Id. at 11. Karn granted the defendant's motion
for summary judgment with respect to the plaintiffs First Amendment claim.
See id. at. 3. The plaintiff also claimed that the AECA and ITAR violate the
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1994), and the Fifth
Amendment right to substantive due process. See Karn, 925 F. Supp. at 3.
The court dismissed the APA claim as nonjusticiable and also granted defen-
dant's motion for summary judgment with respect to the plaintiffs Fifth
Amendment claims. See id.
101. Junger, 8 F. Supp. 2d at 712. To address the plaintiffs claims (in-
cluding that the regulations constituted a prior restraint as well as impermis-
sible content discrimination of speech), the court decided "the most important
issue" of "whether the export of encryption software source code is sufficiently
expressive to merit First Amendment protection." Id. at 715.
102. Id. at 716. In its opinion, the Junger court addressed the contrary
reasoning in the Bernstein district court rulings that preceded it.
103. Id. at 717.
104. See id. at 712. The court denied the plaintiffs motion for summary
judgment and granted the government's motion for summary judgment. See
id. at 711.
105. See id. at 718; see also supra notes 58-65 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing prior restraints and facial challenges).
106. See Junger, 8 F. Supp. 2d at 720-23; see also supra text accompanying
notes 51-57 (discussing content-based and content-neutral regulations). The
court emphasized that the regulations are not "directed at the content of
ideas." Junger, 8 F. Supp. 2d at 720. The regulations satisfy intermediate
scrutiny because they "enable the government to collect vital foreign intelli-
gence, are not directed at a source code's ideas, and do not burden more speech
than necessary." Id. at 723.
107. 176 F.3d 1132, 1138, rehg granted, 192 F.3d 1308 (9th Cir. 1999). The
court chose to frame the issue instead as a prior restraint, although the "par-
ties and amici urge[d] a number of theories" on the court. Id.
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it on the Internet'08 and brought a facial challenge to the regu-
lations on free speech grounds.'0 9 The district court granted
summary judgment to Bernstein and enjoined the government
from future enforcement of the invalidated provisions."l 0 The
Ninth Circuit affirmed,"' but has since vacated this decision
upon granting rehearing en banc. 1 2
108. See id. at 1136-37. The State Department informed Bernstein that he
needed a license because the software was classified as a munition under the
ITAR.
109. See Bernstein, 176 F.3d at 1137. Specifically, Bernstein alleged that
the AECA and the ITAR, both facially and as applied, are content-based in-
fringements on speech and act as unconstitutiorial prior restraints on speech.
See Bernstein v. United States Dep't of State, 922 F. Supp. 1426, 1430 (N.D.
Cal. 1996). Bernstein also challenged the ITAR and AECA on the grounds
that the act and accompanying regulations were vague and overbroad, and in-
fringed the rights of association and equal protection. See id. at 1431. Finally,
Bernstein also alleged that the registration processes, as well as the licensing
procedures were unconstitutional, and that the actions of defendants were ar-
bitrary and capricious and constituted an abuse of discretion under the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act. See id.
110. See Bernstein, 176 F.3d at 1136. The district court first made a pre-
liminary finding that the source code was protected speech under the First
Amendment, see Bernstein v. United States Dep't of State, 922 F. Supp. 1426,
1433-37 (N.D. Cal. 1996), and then held that the ITAR were an unconstitu-
tional prior restraint on speech, see Bernstein v. United States Dep't of State,
945 F. Supp. 1279, 1286-92 (N.D. Cal. 1996). After these decisions, President
Clinton shifted licensing authority for nonmilitary encryption commodities
and technologies from the State Department to the Department of Commerce.
The Commerce Department issued its own Export Administration Regulations
(EAR), which implement the Export Administration Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 2401-
2420 (1994 & Supp. III 1998). Bernstein then amended his complaint to name
the Commerce Department. Again, the district court granted summary judg-
ment to Bernstein, finding the EAR facially invalid as a prior restraint on
speech. See Bernstein v. United States Dep't of State, 974 F. Supp. 1288, 1310
(N.D. Cal. 1996), affd sub nom. Bernstein v. United States Dep't of Justice,
176 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 1999), reh'ggranted, 192 F.3d 1308.
111. See Bernstein, 176 F.3d at 1135. At this point in the litigation, the
EAR were the regulations in question.
112. See Bernstein v. United States Dep't of Justice, 192 F.3d 1308, 1308
(9th Cir. 1999). Oral argument for rehearing is scheduled for March 21, 2000.
See Bernstein v. United States Dep't of Justice, Order Granting Government
Motion to Reschedule Oral Argument, available in EFF 'Legal Cases-Crypto-
Bernstein v. US Dept. of State: Legalese" Archive (last modified Oct. 29, 1999)
<http'/www.eff.orgpub/Privacy/ITA ...Legal/19991028_ordgran _resch.html>.
The court extended the date for oral argument to allow Bernstein and the gov-
ernment to address the changes in the export regulations announced by Presi-
dent Clinton. Although the changes in the regulations may affect the specifics
of the court's prior restraint analysis, they will not affect the issue of whether
source code is speech. Moreover, regardless of what the court holds in this re-
hearing, its initial decision remains significant because its reasoning and
analysis paves the way for other courts to find source code speech in other con-
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The Ninth Circuit began by determining whether Bern-
stein was eligible to bring a facial attack.113 Next, Bernstein
addressed the "more difficult issue" of whether encryption
source code constitutes expression for First Amendment pur-
poses. 114 Based on its understanding of source code and decla-
rations of cryptographers that they use source code expres-
sively, the court concluded that "encryption software, in its
source code form and as employed by those in the field of cryp-
tography, must be viewed as expressive for First Amendment
purposes." 115 The court held that the regulations are an im-
permissible prior restraint 16 because they "allow the govern-
ment to restrain speech indefinitely with no clear criteria for
review."117
II. ENCRYPTION SOFTWARE SOURCE CODE IS NOT
CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED "SPEECH" UNDER
THE FIRST AMENDMENT
First Amendment precedent suggests several ways to ap-
proach the issues of what is protected speech and what
abridges the freedom of speech. This precedent is, however,
limited in its applicability to computer software, as illustrated
by the following critique of the constitutional frameworks of
Bernstein, Junger, and Karn. A technical analysis of software
source code is the only conclusive way to determine whether it
is speech at all. This analysis shows that because source code
is the implementation of an idea, not the expression of it, it is
not entitled to First Amendment protection as a type of speech.
Encryption software may still be, however, entitled to some free
speech protection because it protects the ability to speak pri-
vately.
flicts involving First Amendment challenges to government restrictions on
various types of software.
113. See Bernstein, 176 F.3d at 1139. The court reasoned that the export
regulations are a licensing scheme subject to facial challenge because they
plainly allow the government unrestrained discretion. See id.; see also supra
notes 58-65 and accompanying text (discussing prior restraints and facial
challenges).
114. Bernstein, 176 F.3d at 1139.
115. Id. at 1141.
116. See id. at 1144; see also supra notes 58-65 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing prior restraints and facial challenges).
117. Bernstein, 176 F.3d at 1144-45 (citing Freedman v. Maryland, 380
U.S. 51, 58-59 (1965)).
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A. CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF ENCRYPTION SOFTWARE
As summarized above, Karn, Junger, and Bernstein
reached three distinct conclusions about the constitutionality of
the export regulations of encryption software. That they did so
is not surprising; each differently approached the question of
whether encryption source code is protected under the First
Amendment and whether the export regulations thereby vio-
late the Constitution. A comparison of their conflicting frame-
works exposes gaps and inconsistencies in their free speech
analyses. Moreover, this discussion shows that free speech
precedent is limited in its applicability to software source code
and that constitutional analysis cannot conclusively determine
its status under the First Amendment. In addition, no type of
abridgement analysis can avoid the preliminary issue of
whether source code is speech. Therefore, the only way to de-
termine whether the export regulations abridge the freedom of
speech by virtue of their restrictions on source cod6 is to evalu-
ate technically the nature of source code itself.
1. Is Encryption Software Source Code Protected "Speech"
Under the First Amendment?
Free speech precedent suggests several ways to approach
this issue, as illustrated by Karn, Junger, and Bernstein.
Junger reasoned by analogy with expressive conduct."l 8 Bern-
stein discussed encryption software source code and empha-
sized the expressive intent of cryptographers. 19 Karn avoided
the question entirely by explicitly assuming that encryption
source code is protected under the First Amendment. 120 A cri-
tique of these possible constitutional approaches shows that
none is very relevant to computer software.
a. Is Encryption Source Code Protected "Speech" Because
Writing It Is Expressive Conduct?
The question of what constitutes speech under the First
Amendment,12 1 if asked at all, is most frequently answered in
118. See infra Part II.A.l.a (discussing the expressive conduct approach).
119. Bernstein's factual discussion of source code is critiqued below in Part
II.B.1.
120. See infra Part II.A.2.c (discussing Karn's application of O'Brien inter-
mediate scrutiny following its assumption that the First Amendment protects
encryption source code).
121. See supra notes 29-36 and accompanying text (discussing what activi-
ties the Supreme Court has held expressive for First Amendment purposes).
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the context of symbolic speech. 122 Many important (and fa-
mous) free speech cases involve expressive conduct, such as
dancing, demonstrating, or burning objects. 123  Likewise,
Junger reasoned by analogy with symbolic speech cases to de-
termine whether encryption source code is protected under the
First Amendment, 124 but the court's analysis is limited. Essen-
tially, the court selected a few adjectives from Spence and
Tinker, and concluded that they did not apply to source code;
"[blecause the expressive elements of encryption source code
are neither 'unmistakable' nor 'overwhelmingly apparent,"' the
court held that it is not sufficiently expressive for "heightened"
First Amendment protection. 125
Approaching a novel free speech question by asking if ex-
pressive conduct is involved has the most case law support and
guidance, 26 but limited applicability to source code. A symbolic
speech inquiry is best suited for cases in which the govern-
ment's challenged regulations concern "the expression of an
idea through activity."127 Many of the First Amendment cases
applying this legal framework reason by analogy, and analogy
between symbolic speech and source code is incongruous. De-
veloping software is not like engaging in some kind of demoi-
strative behavior to make a point, particularly a political one. 128
Source code generally is not written to make a statement.
Thus, this approach provides limited guidance to the issue of
source code.
122. See, e.g., Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, & Bisexual Group,
515 U.S. 557 (1995) (parade-marching); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989)
(flag-burning).
123. See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text (discussing expressive
conduct cases).
124. See Junger v. Daley, 8 F. Supp. 2d 708, 717-18 (N.D. Ohio 1998) (cit-
ing Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989); Spence v. Washington, 418
U.S. 405, 409-10 (1974) (per curium); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community
Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505-06 (1969)).
125. Junger, 8 F. Supp. 2d at 717-18.
126. See supra text accompanying notes 15-18 (discussing expressive con-
duct cases).
127. Spence, 418 U.S. at 411.
128. According to the Ninth Circuit, however, Bernstein did just this. See
infra Part II.A.L.c (discussing free speech values).
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b. Is Encryption Source Code Protected "Speech" Because It Is
Written in a Language?
The Supreme Court has asked explicitly whether free
speech is involved when the activity at issue did not involve the
use of language, 129 which could suggest that the use of lan-
guage is presumptively speech under the First Amendment. To
a limited extent, the Ninth Circuit in Bernstein made this ar-
gument;130 conversely, Junger explicitly rejected it.131 It is in-
disputable that source code is written in a programming lan-
guage. On the other hand, human languages and computer
languages are substantively different: natural languages,
though structured syntactically and grammatically, allow for
substantial variation and error, whereas programming lan-
guages do not.132
The use of language might seem, upon initial considera-
tion, like an excellent way to determine whether speech is in-
volved in a particular First Amendment challenge. After all,
humans communicate primarily through language--"the spo-
ken or written word."133 Thus, the use of language could be a
129. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
130. See Bernstein v. United States Dep't of Justice, 176 F.3d 1132, 1140
(describing source code), rehg granted, 192 F.3d 1308 (9th Cir. 1999). The dis-
trict court explicitly relied upon this reasoning. According to the court,
"'[lianguage is by definition speech, and the regulation of any language is the
regulation of speech."' Bernstein v. United States Dep't of State, 922 F. Supp.
1426, 1435 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (quoting Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English,
69 F.3d 920, 935 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc), cert. granted, 517 U.S. 1102 (1996),
vacated on other grounds sub nom. Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona,
520 U.S. 43 (1997)). The court could
find no meaningful difference between computer language, particu-
larly high-level languages as defined above, and German or French.
All participate in a complex system of understood meanings within
specific communities. Even object code, which directly instructs the
computer, operates as a "language." When the source code is con-
verted into the object code "language," the object program still con-
tains the text of the source program. The expression of ideas, com-
mands, objectives and other contents of the source program are
merely translated into machine-readable code.
Id.
131. See Junger v. Daley, 8 F. Supp. 2d 708, 716 (N.D. Ohio 1998)
('Speech' is not protected simply because we write it in a language.").
132. They also serve different functions. See infra Part II.B.1 (discussing
the technical nature of source code). Although different programmers may
write different code to solve the same problem, source code's variability, in
contrast to that of human languages, is necessarily extremely limited to make
the code functional (i.e., operational and without bugs).
133. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989).
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simple way to define speech. 3 4 Speech in the sense of the First
Amendment is not, however, defined this way.'35 Free speech
protection is not limited to speech using language, as evidenced
by expressive conduct cases. 136 The First Amendment also pro-
tects artistic expression void of language, such as paintings and
sculptures. 137 Moreover, the fact that the First Amendment
applies to expression using language does not necessarily mean
that anything spoken or written in a language is expressive,
and therefore within its protection.138 American Sign Lan-
guage provides for human communication and expression (and
is surely entitled to First Amendment protection) despite its
lack of text. Conversely, source code's use of text does not alone
make it speech.
Although a more involved analysis about language and the
freedom of speech would be interesting and worthwhile, an-
other reason to reject this approach as inconclusive is elemen-
tary: the Supreme Court's categorical exclusion of some speech,
like obscenity and fighting words, from the reach of the First
Amendment. 39 These forms of expression are not protected,
regardless of their use of language (which is likely vulgar,
common language more familiar to most than complex com-
134. This might not be so simple after all, though, because defining what
constitutes "language" is likely fraught with as many difficulties as the issue
of what constitutes "speech."
135. Two lower court cases have defined speech this way. See Yniguez v.
Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920, 934-36 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc),
cert. granted, 517 U.S. 1102 (1996), vacated sub nom. Arizonans for Official
English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43 (1997); Asian Am. Bus. Group v. City of
Pomona, 716 F. Supp. 1328, 1330 (C.D. Cal. 1989). The Supreme Court has
not, however, done so.
136. See, e.g., Johnson, 491 U.S. at 404 ("We have long recognized that
[First Amendment] protection does not end at the spoken or written word.").
In some sense, expressive conduct cases also rely on language, albeit clearly
recognizable "body language," but the Supreme Court does not approach the
issue of symbolic speech in this way.
137. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 34 (1973) ("The First
Amendment protects works which, taken as a whole, have serious literary, ar-
tistic, political, or scientific value."); see also Massachusetts v. Oakes, 491 U.S.-
576, 591 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Photography, painting, and other
two-dimensional forms of reproduction . . . are plainly expressive activities
that ordinarily qualify for First Amendment protection.").
138. See supra text accompanying notes 37-40 (discussing the exclusion of
certain types of speech such as fighting words and obscenity from First
Amendment protection).
139. See supra notes 25-28 and text accompanying notes 37-40 (discussing
what types of speech the Supreme Court has excluded categorically from First
Amendment protection).
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puter languages). Therefore, whether source code is speech
must necessarily be based, at least in part, on some other
analysis.
c. Is Encryption Source Code Protected "Speech" Because Its
Use Can Implicate Free Speech Values?
The determination of what constitutes protected speech
under the First Amendment may also involve a consideration of
free speech values. 40 Such values have lent support both to
categorically excluding and including types of expression under
the protection of the First Amendment.' 41 Indeed, there is
some authority for the argument that values are the determin-
ing factor of what speech is not protected.1 42 Consideration of
values is also relevant to the expressive conduct approach dis-
cussed above. 43 For example, in Spence v. Washington, the
Supreme Court emphasized the appellant's sincere and moving
political statement protesting the invasion of Cambodia and the
related killings at Kent State by displaying a flag with a peace
sign affixed. 144
Core free speech values can be related to the use of source
code, as both Bernstein and Junger demonstrate. Writing
source code is an integral part of scientific research in many
140. This type of inquiry might also be appealing or invalid, depending on
one's view of the judicial role. In a way, considering free speech values to de-
termine whether the First Amendment applies is like taking policy into ac-
count when interpreting legislation. It can provide useful guidance, but may
also result in judicial activism.
141. See supra text accompanying notes 19-28, 37-40 (discussing free
speech values and the categorical exclusion of several types of speech, like
fighting words, obscenity, and defamation because they do not serve such val-
ues).
142. According to the Supreme Court, "our society... has permitted re-
strictions upon the content of speech in a few limited areas, which are 'of such
slight social value as a step to truth.'" RA.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377,
382-83 (1992) (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572
(1942)).
143. See supra Part II.A.l.a.
144. 418 U.S. 405, 409 (1974) (per curiam) (making a very qualified holding
by emphasizing that the flag was privately owned, displayed on private prop-
erty, not permanently defaced, etc.); see also Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397,
420 (1989) (holding a demonstrator's flag-burning a protected activity 15 years
later without the many qualifications). In Spence, the Court noted "that this
was not an act of mindless nihilism. Rather, it was a pointed expression of
anguish by appellant about the then-current domestic and foreign affairs of
his government." Spence, 418 U.S. at 410. But cf Johnson, 491 U.S. at 432
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (describing flag burning as "the equivalent of an
inarticulate grunt or roar").
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fields. 45 Moreover, scientific expression is one of four types of
speech often specified as highly valued under the Constitution:
the Supreme Court has repeatedly noted that the First
Amendment protects "literary, artistic, political, or scientific
expression." 146 Likewise, Bernstein emphasized that the export
regulations burden "scientific expression." 147 That some scien-
tists write source code as part of their research, however, does
not make it scientific expression 148
Interestingly, the use of source code may also implicate
free speech values related to political expression. Junger, a law
professor, apparently wanted to post encryption software on the
Internet for a course about computers and the law, in part, to
challenge the export regulations. 49 Similarly, Bernstein, a
mathematics and computer science professor, sought to post his
source code on the Internet, in part, according to the Ninth Cir-
cuit, as "political expression" based on his view of the export
regulations as "absurd."'150 This consideration did not control
the court's decision, but it, much like Spence's actions, appears
to have influenced the court.
A consideration of free speech values should not, however,
determine whether source code is protected speech under the
First Amendment. Although this type of analysis can be in-
sightful, it often can be a stretch. In the Supreme Court's deci-
sion holding commercial speech entitled to some First Amend-
ment protection, Justice Blackmun's emphasis on consumers'
and society's "strong interest in the free flow of commercial in-
formation" is weak.151 Learning where liquor is cheapest, 152 for
example, is not significant to encouraging debate about the
most important social and political issues of the day. At one
145. Writing source code is, of course, also an integral part of commercial
softvare development. This commercial aspect of source code does not prevent
it from being speech, see supra note 33 and accompanying text, but does not
cut in favor of finding it speech either.
146. E.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15,23 (1973).
147. Bernstein v. United States Dep't of Justice, 176 F.3d 1132, 1135, reh'g
granted, 192 F.3d 1308 (9th Cir. 1999).
148. This issue is discussed more fully in Part II.B.1.
149. See Junger v. Daley, 8 F. Supp. 2d 708, 713-14 (N.D. Ohio 1998). The
plaintiffs website included documents about the litigation. See id.
150. Bernstein, 176 F.3d at 1141 n.14.
151. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Coun-
cil, 425 U.S. 748, 763-65 (1976).
152. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996)
(holding that ban on price advertising for alcoholic beverages abridged speech
in violation of First Amendment).
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time, pornographic films would routinely include brief political
commentary at their beginning or end in order to claim First
Amendment protection.'5 3 Just as obscenity is really about sex,
not politics, source code is really about computer programming,
not expression. Therefore, the fact that its use may implicate
free speech values should not determine its First Amendment
status.
d. Is Encryption Source Code Protected "Speech" Because
Programmers Intend To Speak?
Some free speech precedent suggests that an actor's ex-
pressive intent may be relevant to determining whether the
First Amendment is applicable. 54 Similarly, Bernstein relies
on declarations from cryptographers and programmers that
they express their cryptographic ideas and communicate with
others in the field through source code.155 This approach is
flawed.
The fact that cryptographers declare source code expres-
sive is not a sufficient basis for bringing it within the protection
of the First Amendment, particularly when such declarations
are self-serving. For one thing, this way of understanding
source code is not universal. 56 More importantly, what consti-
tutes speech should not be based on the opinions of those en-
gaged in the activity. Surely plaintiffs often bring free speech
challenges not because they thought they were engaging in
speech, but rather because their lawyers see this as a potential
legal ground to support their clients' interests. On the other
hand, if Johnson had burned a flag to stay warm, 157 rather than
153. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer & Richard H. Pildes, Electoral Exception-
alism and the First Amendment, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1803, 1828-29 (1999) (citing
FREDERICK F. SCHAUER, THE LAW OF OBSCENITY 43, 138-39 (1976)).
154. See, e.g., Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974) (per cu-
riam) ("An intent to convey a particularized message was present.").
155. See Bernstein, 176 F.3d at 1140 (noting "declarations from cryptogra-
phers and computer programmers explaining that cryptographic ideas and al-
gorithms are conveniently expressed in source code").
156. Casual conversations with programmers and others involved in the
software field suggest that Bernstein's understanding is a minority position.
157. Bernstein raised this possibility in the context of rejecting the gov-
ernment's functionality argument, stating that if functionality trumped ex-
pression "we would have expected the Supreme Court to start and end its
analysis of David Paul O'Brien's burning of his draft card with an inquiry into
whether he was kept warm by the flames." Bernstein, 176 F.3d at 1142 n.16.
This reasoning does not hold up, however, since O'Brien and Johnson clearly
burned a draft card and flag respectively to make political statements, not to
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to protest President Reagan, his claim challenging Texas's flag
desecration statute likely would have been unsuccessful.
58
Nonetheless, according to the Supreme Court, "[wie cannot ac-
cept the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct
can be labeled 'speech' whenever the person engaging in the
conduct intends thereby to express an idea."1 59 In addition, an
actor's intent regarding categorically unprotected categories of
speech is irrelevant to free speech protection. Therefore, al-
though some computer programmers may profess their intent
to express ideas through source code, this intent is not suffi-
cient to bring source code within the First Amendment's protec-
tion.
e. Is Encryption Source Code Protected "Speech" Because It
May Be Copyrighted?
One might think that copyright law could help determine
whether source code is speech under the First Amendment,
given that both areas of law protect expression. Although there
is no Supreme Court case law suggesting any connection, the
district court in Bernstein used the fact that computer software
(including both source code and object code) may be copyrighted
to support its conclusion that source code is speech. 160 The
Ninth Circuit was careful to avoid this comparison, explicitly
making a narrower holding than the district court. 161 Likewise,
Junger correctly did not discuss copyright law in its determina-
tion that source code is not protected speech under the First
Amendment. Although this approach would provide some tidy
analytical consistency, there is simply no precedent that what
is "speech" under the First Amendment is the same as "expres-
sion" that may be copyrighted. 62
keep warm. It is unnecessary for the Court to state what is obvious.
158. See generally Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
159. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
160. See Bernstein v. United States Dep't of State, 922 F. Supp. 1426, 1436
(N.D. Cal. 1996). "While copyright and First Amendment law are by no means
coextensive, and the analogy between the two should not be stretched too far,
copyright law does lend support to the conclusion that source code is a means
of original expression." Id.
161. See Bernstein v. United States Dep't of Justice, 176 F.3d 1132, 1135
1145, rehg granted, 192 F.3d 1308 (9th Cir. 1999) ("[We employ a somewhat
narrower rationale than did the district court .... We emphasize the narrow-
ness of our First Amendment holding. We do not hold that all software is ex-
pressive. Much of it surely is not.").
162. See Dan L. Burk, Patenting Speech 15-17 (Oct. 1999) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the author) (discussing why it is problematic to
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2. Do the Export Regulations of Encryption Software
"Abridge" the Freedom of Speech?
As shown, Bernstein, Junger, and Karn each determined
differently whether encryption source code is protected speech
under the First Amendment. In addition, no case properly con-
cluded that encryption source code is protected speech before
proceeding to ask whether the export regulations thereby
abridge the freedom of speech. Bernstein began with and lim-
ited its analysis to prior restraint. Junger applied several
types of abridgement analysis to the export regulations despite
the court's initial conclusion that source code is not protected
under the First Amendment. Karn assumed that encryption
source code is protected speech but substantially ignored prior
restraint analysis. A critique of these approaches shows that
whether encryption source code is protected under the First
Amendment must be answered before abridgment is consid-
ered. If source code is not protected speech, abridgment of
speech by regulations of encryption source code need not be
considered.
a. Do the Export Regulations "Abridge" Speech Because They
Are a Prior Restraint?
First Amendment precedent is clear that licensing schemes
may constitute prior restraints and thereby abridge the free-
dom of speech.163 Whether the export regulations of encryption
software are a prior restraint was dismissed by Karn and ad-
dressed by Junger and Bernstein. A critique of their ap-
proaches shows that prior restraint analysis might apply to the
challenged regulations, but only if it is first determined that
encryption source code is speech protected by the First
Amendment.
Karn's substantial neglect of prior restraint is puzzling
given its express assumption that encryption source code is
protected by the First Amendment 64 Karn asserted that
"claims of facial overbreadth and vagueness are rarely enter-
tained with respect to content-neutral regulations,"165 empha-
equate expression in the First Amendment and copyright sense and explaining
tensions between the doctrines).
163. See supra text accompanying notes 58-65 (discussing licensing
schemes and prior restraint analysis).
164. See Karn v. United States Dep't of State, 925 F. Supp. 1, 12-13 (D.D.C.
1996).
165. Id. at 13 (citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973)).
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sizing the intent of the government regulations. The intent of
government regulations is, however, irrelevant to prior re-
straint analysis.1 66 Thus, if source code is speech, prior re-
straints on it may violate the First Amendment.
Junger's prior restraint analysis is confusing for the oppo-
site reason. The court's initial determination that encryption
source code is not sufficiently expressive for First Amendment
protection should end its First Amendment analysis, given that
the freedom of speech does not apply to unprotected speech. 167
For this reason, Junger's prior restraint analysis is largely an
academic exercise, as the court rejected a facial challenge by its
conclusion that "exporting encryption software has little ex-
pressive nature."'68
Bernstein's prior restraint inquiry is also flawed. The
Ninth Circuit explicitly limited its First Amendment determi-
nation to whether the challenged export regulations constitute
a prior restraint on speech. 169 The court asked first, whether
the government has "'unbridled discretion,"' and second,
whether the regulations have "'a close enough nexus to expres-
sion."' 70 Because it is not clear that the First Amendment even
applies to source code, the court's second question should be re-
solved before the government's level of discretion is considered.
More importantly, Bernstein's prior restraint analysis is
inappropriate because the court did not conclude that source
code in general is protected speech. Prior restraint analysis is
limited to situations in which government regulations are "'di-
rected narrowly... at expression or conduct commonly associ-
166. See supra notes 58-65 and accompanying text (discussing City of
Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750 (1988)).
167. See supra text accompanying notes 44-46. Junger applied both prior
restraint and content discrimination analysis, as well as O'Brien intermediate
scrutiny. See Junger v. Daley, 8 F. Supp. 2d 708, 718-19, 720-23 (N.D. Ohio
1998).
168. Junger, 8 F. Supp. 2d at 718.
169. See Bernstein v. United States Dep't of Justice, 176 F.3d 1132, 1138,
reh'g granted, 192 F.3d 1308 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating that although "[tihe par-
ties and amici urge a number of theories," the court limited its attention to
only one). It is unclear why the court selected this "theory," because no expla-
nation or rejection of any others is provided. See id. The conclusion that the
regulations do constitute a prior restraint meant the court need not "resolve
whether the challenged regulations constitute content-based.., or... con-
tent-neutral restrictions." Id. at 1145.
170. Id. at 1139 (quoting City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486
U.S. 750, 763 (1988)).
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ated with expression." 171 For example, the facially challenged
regulation in City of Lakewood affected the distribution of
newspapers-speech to which the First Amendment inarguably
applies. 172 Unlike the regulation of newspaper circulation, the
export regulations are not directed toward clearly protected ex-
pression. Indeed, if this were the case, whether source code
constitutes speech would not be so difficult for courts to deter-
mine. 173 The export regulations are precisely the type of law of
"general application" that the Supreme Court distinguished
from the type of regulation found unconstitutional in City of
Lakewood.174 In that case, the Court explained that the dis-
sent's analogy between regulations affecting the distribution of
newspapers versus soda vendors was inapposite because
"[n]ewspapers are in the business of expression, while soda
vendors are in the business of selling soft drinks."1 75 Likewise,
source code, unlike newspapers, is in the business of program-
ming computers, not expression. Therefore, although prior re-
straint analysis might apply to the export regulations, the issue
of whether source code is speech must first be resolved.
b. Do the Export Regulations "Abridge" Speech Because They
Are Content-Based?
Although a primary purpose of the freedom of speech is to
prevent the government from censoring a message with which
it disagrees, 176 the only case to address this type of abridge-
ment is the case to hold that encryption source code is not pro-
tected by the First Amendment. 177 If, as Junger concluded, en-
171. Id. at 1149 (Nelson, J., dissenting) (quoting Roulette v. City of Seattle,
97 F.3d 300, 305 (9th Cir. 1996)). The dissent in Bernstein suggested that
Bernstein's activities may be "entitled to First Amendment protection, but
that the legal path chosen to get to that protection must be the correct one."
Id.
172. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
173. See Bernstein, 176 F.3d at 1139 (stating that the "more difficult issue"
is "whether encryption source code is expression" under the First Amend-
ment).
174. See City of Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 760-61.
175. Id. at 761.
176. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text (discussing content-
based regulations).
177. See Junger v. Daley, 8 F. Supp. 2d 708, 720-23 (N.D. Ohio 1998). In
contrast, Bernstein, concluding that the regulations constitute an impermissi-
ble prior restraint on the freedom of speech, noted that it "need [not] resolve
whether the challenged regulations constitute content-based restrictions,
subject to the strictest constitutional scrutiny, or whether they are, instead,
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cryption source code is not protected speech, how could the ex-
port regulations possibly be abridging speech through imper-
missible content-based discrimination? The plaintiffs' argu-
ment is that, first, source code is speech and, second, the
regulations are content-based because they regulate only en-
cryption software. This is, however, illogical; encryption is not
the content of the source code, but its function. 78
c. Do the Export Regulations "Abridge" Speech If They Are
Content-Neutral?
Karn and Junger both addressed whether the export
regulations at issue satisfy intermediate scrutiny based on
their preliminary findings that the regulations are content-
neutral, 7 9 but the analysis by both courts is flawed. If encryp-
tion source code is not protected speech, as Junger concluded,
this analysis is unnecessary. 180 If encryption source code is
protected speech, as Karn assumed, the burdens on expression
must be balanced to apply O'Brien intermediate scrutiny.
Thus, this type of approach cannot avoid the issue of whether
encryption source code is speech under the First Amendment.
Because the O'Brien standard 181 is so lenient and easily re-
solved in favor of the government, courts may simply assume
that speech is involved when a First Amendment claim is
raised. 8 2 Karn did just this, resolving the free speech chal-
lenge to the export regulations without addressing the under-
lying, and most interesting, constitutional question. Given the
limited guidance about what (other than traditional forms of
expression and expressive conduct) is speech under the First
content-neutral restrictions meriting less exacting scrutiny." Bernstein v.
United States Dep't of Justice, 176 F.3d 1132, 1145, reh'g granted, 192 F.3d
1308 (9th Cir. 1999).
178. The difficulty of applying this type of free speech analysis also sug-
gests that source code should not be considered speech.
179. See supra notes 98-106. See generally supra notes 54-57 and accom-
panying text (discussing judicial scrutiny of content-neutral regulations).
180. The Junger court reasoned that since the regulations were not con-
tent-based, they must be content-neutral. See Junger, 8 F. Supp. 2d at 721.
Given its conclusion that encryption source code is not protected under the
First Amendment, however, the court did not need to consider the intent of the
regulations at all.
181. See supra text accompanying notes 54-57.
182. See supra notes 98-106 and accompanying text (summarizing the
Karn and Junger courts' holdings).
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Amendment, this approach has some appeal. It also has some
support.183
There is authority for the proposition that when the gov-
ernment's intent is content-neutral, a predicate determination
of whether speech is involved is unnecessary. The Supreme
Court has stated, in outlining its free speech analysis, that "[ilf
the State's regulation is not related to expression, then the less
stringent standard we announced in United States v. O'Brien
for regulations of noncommunicative conduct controls.' 8 4 R.
Polk Wagner describes this teleological approach as one of two
methods of threshold First Amendment analysis employed by
the Supreme Court. 185 This approach cannot, however, remove
entirely the issue of what constitutes speech under the First
Amendment. Karn is incorrect that "it is unnecessary... to
make any finding regarding the nature" of source code.' 86 For
one thing, if source code is protected speech under the First
Amendment, prior restraint analysis may apply regardless of
the government's intent.187 For another, although Karn did not
discuss incidental burdens on expression by the export regula-
tions, this is one of the four factors a court must balance under
O'Brien.8 8 Karn is correct that "[t]he rationale for a regulation
determines the level of scrutiny to be applied,"'8 9 but if the
First Amendment does not apply in the first place, there is no
need to determine the corresponding level of judicial scrutiny.
Thus, courts must ultimately answer the question of whether
encryption source code is speech under the First Amendment.
3. Can Constitutional Analysis Resolve the Issue?
As discussed, First Amendment precedent suggests several
ways to approach the issues of what is speech and what
abridges speech. Whether speech is abridged cannot be an-
swered, however, until it is determined whether speech is even
involved. Moreover, whether speech is involved cannot be ade-
quately determined by constitutional precedent. This is be-
cause the predicate free speech question most often answered
183. See Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293
(1984) (assuming that expression is involved and applying O'Brien).
184. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 403 (1989).
185. See Wagner, supra note 12, at 390-91.
186. Karn v. United States Dep't of State, 925 F. Supp. 1, 10 (D.D.C. 1996).
187. See supra Part II.A.2.a.
188. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994).
189. Karn, 925 F. Supp. at 10.
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by the Supreme Court is whether the speech involved is pro-
tected speech, not whether speech is involved at all. 190
Similarly, Junger appears to have assumed that source
code is speech under the First Amendment, but that certain
"expressive software" is entitled to protection, whereas other
"inherently functional" software is not.191 For example, in re-
jecting the use of language as a determinant factor of what con-
stitutes speech, Junger stated that "[sipeech' is not protected
simply because we write it in a language,"192 suggesting that
the court presumed that source code is speech and that its in-
quiry was limited to whether encryption source code, in par-
ticular, is protected. Bernstein noted that it did not hold that
all source code is expressive and also explicitly limited its
holding to encryption software.193 Whereas Junger found "en-
cryption software... especially functional rather than expres-
sive," asserting that "[c]ertain software is inherently expres-
sive" and "other software is inherently functional," 194 Bernstein
found encryption source code expressive.
Because no precedent establishes the status of source code
under the First Amendment, the proper question is not
whether encryption source code, in particular, is protected, but
rather whether source code, in general, is categorically speech
at all. 195 The difficulties of a categorical approach are illus-
trated well by the Supreme Court's efforts to define obscen-
ity.196 If categorizing something is as difficult as determining
whether it constitutes speech, this approach does not simplify
190. As a result, there are several categories of unprotected (and less-
protected) speech under the First Amendment. See supra text accompanying
notes 29-40; see also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383 (1992) ("[A]
limited categorical approach has remained an important part of our First
Amendment jurisprudence.").
191. Junger v. Daley, 8 F. Supp. 2d 708, 716 (N.D. Ohio 1998) (stating that
to review regulations of software under the First Amendment, the court needs
to examine the particular type of software involved).
192. Id.
193. See Bernstein v. United States Dep't of Justice, 176 F.3d 1132, 1145,
reh'ggranted, 192 F.3d 1308 (9th Cir. 1999).
194. Junger, 8 F. Supp. 2d at 716.
195. Precedent does establish that speech via the Internet is entitled to
First Amendment protection. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
Thus, if source code is speech, posting it on the Internet does not alter this
status.
196. See, e.g., Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., con-




the analysis, but this difficulty is not present with regard to
source code. Although there may be a fuzzy line between what
is obscene and what is not, the distinction between algorithms
and source code is clear.197 Wagner concludes that focusing on
the medium is a mistake under the First Amendment,198 but a
technical analysis is the only conclusive way to determine
whether the "medium" (source code) is speech in the first place.
B. TECHNICAL ANALYSIS OF ENCRYPTION SOFTWARE
As discussed, a technical analysis of software source code is
the only way to determine conclusively whether it is speech un-
der the First Amendment. This analysis shows that source
code is not the expression of an idea, but its implementation:
the act of writing source code is analogous to the act of con-
structing a machine. Moreover, implications of finding source
code speech expose flaws inherent in this conclusion. There-
fore, source code is not speech under the First Amendment (and
the government's export regulations of encryption software do
not thereby abridge the freedom of speech). Encryption soft-
ware, in particular, may be entitled to First Amendment pro-
tection, however, because it provides for private speech.
1. Software Source Code Is Not Speech Under the First
Amendment
Bernstein and Junger both approached the issue of
whether encryption source code is speech under the First
Amendment, in part, by analyzing the nature of source code.
Bernstein's discussion of source code is, however, fundamen-
tally flawed. 199 Junger's discussion is brief and inconsistent, as
the court interchangeably describes the issue as "whether en-
cryption source code is sufficiently expressive to merit height-
ened First Amendment protection"0° and "whether the export of
encryption software source code is sufficiently expressive to
197. See supra note 79 (providing an example of an algorithm, written in
natural language, and source code for the Sieve of Eratosthenes).
198. See Wagner, supra note 12, at 408.
199. The court stated that the government's view did not reflect a proper
understanding of source code, but the flawed understanding is the court's own.
See Bernstein v. United States Dep't of Justice, 176 F.3d 1132, 1145, reh'g
granted, 192 F.3d 1308 (9th Cir. 1999). Whatever decision the Ninth Circuit
reaches upon its rehearing en banc in the Bernstein case, its initial reasoning
remains significant because of its novel analysis.
200. Junger v. Daley, 8 F. Supp. 2d 708, 712 (N.D. Ohio 1998).
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merit First Amendment protection."20' 1 Moreover, the technical
analysis of encryption software by both courts appears prem-
ised on their respective First Amendment conclusions. Bern-
stein emphasized that source code, as distinguished from object
code, cannot be executed directly by a machine and stated that
source code's "distinguishing feature" is that it can be "read and
understood by humans."20 2 In contrast, Junger emphasized
that "source code and object code are essentially interchange-
able" and that although "source code is not directly executable
by a computer, the computer can easily convert it into executa-
ble object code."20 3
First, contrary to Bernstein's reasoning, source code is the
implementation of an idea, not the expression of it. 2 ° 4 In con-
cluding otherwise, Bernstein's most significant and pervasive
flaw is the conflation of idea and implementation-of speech
and of product. Bernstein emphasized that a "distinguishing
feature of source code is... that it can be used to express an
idea or a method.'2 °s The court stated further that Bernstein
described his encryption method in his source code.2 6 Bern-
stein's source code is not an expression of his encryption
method, however, but the method itself.20 7 Likewise, contrary
to the court's statements, cryptographers do not express
201. Id. at 715 (emphasis added). As a result, it is not clear whether it is
encryption source code itself or its export that the Junger court determined is
not protected speech.
202. Bernstein, 176 F.3d at 1140 ("A computer, in fact, can make no direct
use of source code until it has been translated ('compiled') into a 'low-level' or
'machine' language, resulting in computer-executable 'object code.'").
203. Junger, 8 F. Supp. 2d at 712.
204. Junger correctly stated that "what determines whether the First
Amendment protects something is whether it expresses ideas." Id. at 716
(citing Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)).
205. Bernstein, 176 F.3d. at 1140. The court acknowledged that source
code can only be understood by those with a knowledge of programming lan-
guages, but noted that "[fit must be emphasized ... that source code is merely
text." Id. at 1140 n.11.
206. See id. at 1136 ("Bernstein described his method in two ways: in a pa-
per.., and in two computer programs .. ").
207. The district court made the same mistake as the Ninth Circuit panel.
It wrote that "[a]n encryption program expressed in source code communicates
to other programmers and ultimately to the computer itself how to make the
encryption algorithm (the idea) functional." Bernstein v. United States Dep't
of State, 922 F. Supp. 1426, 1436 (N.D. Cal. 1996). This is flatly wrong.
Source code does not express how to make the encryption algorithm func-
tional; it makes the encryption algorithm functional.
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mathematical ideas by utilizing source code;20 cryptographers
(and other computer programmers) implement algorithms by
writing source code to develop software. Mathematicians and
computer scientists express algorithmic ideas in natural lan-
guage or with equations and other mathematical descrip-
tions.209 The expression of an algorithm is speech, but the im-
plementation of an algorithm is not. Bernstein also noted that
declarations from cryptographers attested to "ongoing suppres-
sion of academic publication" by the export regulations.210 The
regulations suppress only the distribution of source code in
electronic form, however, not academic publications discussing
or printing segments of source code. Bernstein thus conflates
expression about encryption methods with encryption software
itself.
Books, sculptures, films, and paintings, however, are all
both the implementation of ideas and also protected speech at
the core of the First Amendment (at least as long as they are
not "obscene"). Why is source code any different? It is not that
"even one drop of 'direct functionality' overwhelms any consti-
tutional protections" as the government tried to assert in Bern-
stein,211 but that source code is fundamentally different from
these examples, whose primary function is expression. The
function of source code is not to provide a medium for expres-
sion, but to program a computer.212 In fact, the Ninth Circuit
even acknowledged that source code is really the implementa-
tion of a method to solve a problem, not a description of how to
do it. The court noted that posting software facilitates peer re-
view, by subjecting a working model of an encryption method to
rigorous testing.213 Of course the implementation of an idea-
be it software, a mechanical device, or a meal214-may often con-
208. Bernstein, 176 F.3d. at 1141 ("By utilizing source code, a cryptogra-
pher can express algorithmic ideas ....").
209. See supra note 79 (providing an example of an algorithm, written in
natural language, and source code for the Sieve of Eratosthenes).
210. Bernstein, 176 F.3d at 1136 n.3.
211. Id. at 1142. The court disagreed, stating "[t]his cannot be so." Id.
212. Of course, sometimes a computer program does provide a medium for
expression, such as, for example, serving as a word processor. See infra Part
II.B.3 (discussing potential First Amendment protection of software that pro-
vides for protected expression).
213. Bernstein, 176 F.3d at 1136, 1141 (noting also that Bernstein was
"seeking to present his work.., within the academic and scientific communi-
ties").
214. For example, the author published a recipe for soup. See N. Coult &
K. Moerke, Gingered Pumpkin-Pear Soup, BETTER HOMES & GARDENS, Sept.
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vey information about the idea, but the First Amendment is not
so broad as to protect all implementation of ideas. As the Su-
preme Court has stated, "[i]t is possible to find some kernel of
expression in almost every activity a person undertakes-for
example, walking down the street or meeting one's friends at a
shopping mall-but such a kernel is not sufficient to bring the
activity within the protection of the First Amendment."215
Second, writing source code is equivalent to a method for
constructing a machine. Bernstein emphasized that "source
code is not meant solely for the computer"216 and that "[a] com-
puter... can make no direct use of source code."217 Source code
is not so much meant for "human analysis and understand-
ing,"218 however, as it is meant to allow people to program com-
puters. Source code is primarily communication to a com-
puter-speech to a machine. Source code is written in a
language so that people can develop software, by writing, edit-
ing, and revising code in an understandable form (which object
code is not). As discussed above, computers were originally de-
veloped to perform specific functions.219 Programmers "pro-
grammed" a computer by directly modifying the hardware.
Software was developed to allow one computer to perform nu-
merous functions, without hardware modifications. Higher-
level programming languages were developed to allow pro-
grammers to more easily write software. Theoretically, pro-
grammers could still develop software by writing object code di-
rectly, but this is not realistic. In practice, it is impossible to do
so for any non-trivial program. 220 Thus, writing source code is
1998, at 265. Others might read the recipe to learn how to make the soup.
Readers might even follow the recipe to make the soup themselves. Readers
might also learn about this author's culinary ideas from the recipe, but these
ideas would be better expressed in an essay-or perhaps notes accompanying
the recipe. The best way for another cook to review the soup is to eat it. But
obviously, the soup is not speech.
215. City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989).
216. Bernstein, 176 F.3d at 1142.
217. Id. at 1140.
218. Id. at 1142.
219. See supra note 73.
220. Programmers would understandably find it challenging to keep a list
of millions of numbers straight in their minds. Modification of the code or al-
terations to enable running the software on different hardware would be
similarly possible in theory and impossible in practice. The dissenting opinion
in Bernstein argues this point. See Bernstein, 176 F.3d at 1147 (Nelson, J.,
dissenting). "Softivare engineers generally do not create software in object




how people allow a computer to function as several different
machines.
Because it is difficult to conceptualize what cannot be eas-
ily observed, an analogy to a simple machine is instructive. As
noted above, an algorithm is a method for solving a problem.
Source code implements the algorithm, making it functional. A
compiler creates object code from source code. Object code, in
turn, operates a computer.221 Similarly, the making of a mold
is a way to form a material into a particular shape. The design
specifications for a mold are analogous to the algorithm. The
mold itself is analogous to the source code, as it is what allows
for the making of and sets out the parameters of the end prod-
uct. The end product, the molded shape, is analogous to the
object code. Bernstein made much of the fact that source code
must be compiled by a machine before it can operate a com-
puter,222 but this is also true for the mold: a machine must do
something with the mold to make the end product. The appa-
ratus that fills the mold with material is analogous to the com-
piler. Just as one does not need to know how the mold was
constructed to operate this apparatus, one does not need to
know how source code was designed to compile it.
Obviously, source code is very different from a physical
mold. The differences are, however, in the type of engineering
involved, not the fact that engineering is present. Like the
mold, source code is simply a way to make something. It just
does so in a much more technical way that is difficult for most
people who do not write source code, including lawyers and
judges, to understand. Neither the mold nor the source code is
speech.
Third, implications of Bernstein's holding expose flaws in-
herent in finding source code to be speech. Some of these arise
outside of the First Amendment context with regard to intellec-
tual property law.223 In the free speech context, the reasoning
of the Bernstein opinion, if logically extended, would allow the
First Amendment to apply to a wide range of activities to which
it has not previously been applicable. In particular, with re-
gard to scientific research and invention, the case suggests that
the products of one's work are entitled to First Amendment
protection as much as papers or lectures discussing them. If a
221. See supra notes 73-79 and accompanying text.
222. See Bernstein, 176 F.3d at 1140.
223. See generally Burk, supra note 162 (discussing myriad potentially
problematic consequences to copyright and patent law).
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scientist develops a nuclear weapon, her specifications are
speech.224 If she were to construct a component of the weapon
based upon her specifications, the component would be an ex-
cellent way for others in the field to understand it, provide
feedback on it, and otherwise engage in discourse about her
ideas about it. The construction itself, however, is not speech.
Another scientist might be working on a cure for cancer
rather than making bombs. This scientist genetically engineers
mice. He would like not just to write or talk about his research,
experiments, and findings, but demonstrate his mice them-
selves and their properties to professional colleagues. The ge-
netically-engineered mice are no more speech than the bomb,
although much of the logic of the Bernstein opinion would make
them so. Likewise, source code, although not a completed soft-
ware product, is distinct from the mathematical algorithms it
implements. 225 The algorithms, as the Bernstein court notes,
are surely entitled to First Amendment protection.226 However,
a clear line can be drawn at source code.22 7 In finding encryp-
tion software source code to be speech, Bernstein does not draw
a principled line between what is speech and what is not.
2. The Export Regulations Do Not Abridge the Freedom of
Speech by Restricting Source Code
Because source code is not speech under the First Amend-
ment, asking if the export regulations abridge the freedom of
speech by restricting source code is an inappropriate question.
This point seems obvious, but Junger's analysis suggests it
might not be so apparent.228 This is not to say that the regula-
tions are wise or useful, only that they do not violate the First
Amendment by virtue of their restrictions on source code itself.
224. Her specifications, though speech, would likely be unprotected speech,
like fighting words. Because of national security, the government would also
likely be able to restrict the distribution of the specifications without violating
the Constitution.
225. See supra note 79.
226. See Bernstein, 176 F.3d at 1141 ("If the government required that
mathematicians obtain a prepublication license prior to publishing material
that included mathematical equations, we have no doubt that such a regime
would be subject to scrutiny as a prior restraint.").
227. See supra note 79. The line between what is speech and what is not
can be drawn between the algorithm and the source code.
228. See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing the abridgement analysis in Bern-
stein, Junger, and Karn).
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Indeed, given that people can easily generate electronic
source code by scanning or retyping printed source code, it is
difficult to see how the regulations could be effective. Moreo-
ver, although this Note concludes that source code is not speech
under the First Amendment, the development of software is
nonetheless critical for much scientific research in certain
fields, and the regulations may thus chill related technological
advancement. 229
3. Encryption Software May Allow for Speech Protected by the
First Amendment
Although source code itself is not speech under the First
Amendment, encryption software may nonetheless be entitled
to some free speech protection. The freedom of speech protects
activities that provide for speech. For example, newspaper
racks are not themselves speech, but the government's regula-
tion of them may abridge the freedom of speech as a prior re-
straint.230 Likewise, encryption software allows for concealed
electronic communication, and the freedom of speech may in-
clude the right to speak confidentially.231 Because of the sig-
nificant role that electronic communication and transfer of in-
formation play in many people's lives, the ability to protect its
privacy is critically important.
In a recent case, the District of Columbia Circuit Court
evaluated a First Amendment challenge to a law that prohibits
the intentional interception of wire, oral, and electronic com-
munications.232 In finding no violation of the freedom of
speech, the court emphasized that the government's purpose
was not only censorial, but actually intended to promote the
229. Some commentators have proposed that the First Amendment pro-
tects the right to research. See, e.g., Richard Delgado & David R. Millen, God,
Galileo, and Government: Toward Constitutional Protection for Scientific In-
quiry, 53 WASH. L. REV. 349 (1978); John A. Robertson, The Scientist's Right
to Research: A Constitutional Analysis, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 1203 (1977). Such a
right would still not necessarily mean that Bernstein could post his source
code on the Internet, given that the posting is not the research itself. Such a
right would also not mean that the source code itself is speech.
230. See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text (discussing prior re-
straints).
231. See supra note 43 and accompanying text; see also supra Part .C (dis-
cussing encryption software).
232. See Boehner v. McDermott, 191 F.3d 463, 464 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (hold-
ing that "an individual [giving] a newspaper the tape recording of a cellular
telephone call he received from the criminals who conducted the illegal eaves-
dropping" is not part of the freedom of speech).
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freedom of speech by protecting private communication. 233
With regulations of encryption software this reasoning cuts the
other way, and suggests that the government's purpose is re-
lated to deterring the freedom of speech by limiting avenues for
protecting its privacy. 234 For these reasons, although this free
speech approach is not the focus of this Note, encryption soft-
ware's specific function may be what implicates the First
Amendment. More broadly, it is the function of particular
software-what it does-that may entitle it to free speech pro-
tection.
CONCLUSION
Whether encryption software source code is protected un-
der the First Amendment is sure to remain an issue. The
Clinton administration continues to modify and relax the ex-
port regulations of encryption software, but people will likely
continue to challenge remaining restrictions on free speech
grounds. Moreover, the broader issue of whether source code is
speech will arise in other contexts, particularly given Bern-
stein's novel initial holding by an influential court. Although
people write source code in languages and source code's use
may implicate free speech values, it is not the protected expres-
sion of an idea, but the unprotected implementation thereof.
Encryption software, in particular, may be entitled to some
First Amendment protection, but source code itself is not
speech under the First Amendment.
233. See id.
234. The Ninth Circuit also noted this function of encryption software and
suggested that the government's regulations, by retarding the development of
encryption, may implicate the Fourth Amendment search and seizure right.
See Bernstein v. United States Dep't of Justice, 176 F.3d 1132, 1145-46, reh'g
granted, 192 F.3d 1308 (9th Cir. 1999).
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